Today in the EU

Can Turkey still experience a change of government or has it passed the Rubicon to the extent that democratic elections do not mean much and the regime is very strong and united around Erdogan? I think that's going to be the key question and the reason this election is so relevant for the international community.

Welcome to EURACTIV’s Beyond the Byline podcast. I’m Anny Tubbs, standing in for Evi Kiorri this week, as we discuss next week’s Turkish presidential elections. These, to be coupled with parliamentary elections on 14th May, are widely regarded as a milestone for 2023.
What is the mood on the ground and how might this influence President Erdogan’s chances of staying in office? As Asli Aydıntaşbaş, a fellow at Brookings Institution in Washington, DC just alluded to, is there scope for a democratic electoral process to herald change? And what is at stake for the European Union and the wider international community?
I was recently in Turkey, in March, and I felt the country was on the edge of a nervous breakdown, in the sense that in February they had this horrific earthquake, which led to the death of over 50,000 people, huge national trauma. But on top, they had elections coming up and in a very polarised atmosphere: that too seemed to be almost an early trauma of sorts.

Indeed, the 6th of February earthquake was a huge tragedy for Turkey and for Syria. Turning to Georgi Gotev, Senior Editor for EURACTIV’s Global Europe Policy hub: President Erdogan has been in power since 1994. You described him in a recent opinion piece as being "between two earthquakes". Can you tell us more?

Erdogan's political career took off 23 years ago, largely due to his ability to exploit the 1999 earthquake. He then exposed corruption, bad governance, poor construction standards, very much the same that is happening today. I remember at that time, the then government of Bülent Ecevit was slow in responding to the disaster, coupled with the 2001 financial crash. At that time that helped Erdogan, his mildly Islamist AKP party, to win the 2002 general elections with an overwhelming majority. He then secured two thirds of the seats in parliament and he further won other elections, each time receiving more votes than on the previous occasion.

Ironically, the 2023 quake seems to signal that Erdogan's political career is facing an uphill battle. Tables have turned and the opposition in Turkey is now questioning Erdogan on his responsibility for the collapse of thousands of newly constructed buildings which should be able to resist a quake of this magnitude. Critics such as opposition CHP party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu argue that, after 20 years in power, Erdogan's government has not prepared the country for earthquakes. A lot of funds have been collected and the government has never fully explained how the sums collected have been spent. Critics have complained that construction standards have not been observed in earthquake zones. They highlight a government amnesty that means violations of the building code could be swept away just by paying a fee. And that left millions, possibly, of buildings with unclear status as to their capacity to resist an earthquake. So yes, Erdogan's political career is largely between those two earthquakes.
And there are, once again, significant concerns about the economy.
I think the biggest concern right now is the macroeconomic instability, the inflation, because since September 2021, Turkis economic management has opted for a policy of lowering interest rates and depreciating the Lira in an attempt to boost investment and exports which would in turn close the current account deficits, produce a surplus, you know, increase investments and then the currency would come down and the inflation would come down as well. Obviously, that set of policies did not produce any of the intended outcomes.

Can Selçuki is the Director of Türkiye Raporu, based in Istanbul.

Now Turkey has a widening current account deficit. Investments are not increasing. Foreign direct investment is at an all time loss. And the central bank reserves are depleted and Turkey right now is really cautious about its FX reserves, and as the current account deficit widens the Central bank and economic management are trying to clamp down on FX demand in the country, through capital controls, which are introduced by regulations on a daily basis, almost. So in short, the expectation of the electorate is a solution to the inflation problem, which is at a double digit around 40, 50% and it was even more than that before in 2022.

Inflation is so high that food prices are really unbearable, even for the middle class. I mean, people have to change. It's not just that you go to the supermarket and eggs are expensive. It's way past that. What Turks are experiencing is things that force lifestyle changes. You have to leave your apartment. You have to take your kid from that school. You have to go back to your village because you cannot afford to live in a city anymore. You have to delay getting married because you cannot buy the sort of white goods, refrigerator and stuff. I think it's leading a lot of people to consider changes.

Can, does the electorate blame President Erdogan for current issues?

Some yes and some no. Some of the electorate obviously blames Erdogan and the government for this. Others on the other hand, some of them blame foreign powers and the general downturn in the global economy with this misfortune of Turkey. Whereas others, while thinking that the government is to be faulted in the current economic situation, they also believe that it's only Erdogan that can again make these problems go away and take Turkey back on its tracks.

By and large, the majority of Turkish citizens do want change. But of course they are divided. They want change but they have different ideologies, different identities, and therefore it's going to be an interesting race to watch.

At this juncture, how polarised is voter opinion?

President Erdogan has been in power for 20 years. He's a divisive figure. Elections are really about him. Do you like him or do you hate him? There's no middle ground. There is no doubt that his power is waning, his support is waning. So you are experiencing more of a doubling down in terms of some of the government's more hardline policies.

The polls have suggested a 60 to 40 divide of the electorate for the past two years. The 60 represents the opposition, six parties united behind Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu. How might this play out?

So the game of the opposition candidate, Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu, is indeed to preserve as much as he can out of the 60%, whereas the game plan of Mr. Erdogan is to swing votes to his side. Now, this is a dynamic that we've been seeing for the first time because in the past 20 years, it was always Mr. Erdogan that started the elections in the lead, and the roles were the other way around whereby Mr. Erdogan would try to preserve his support and the opposition would be in the attacking positions and Mr. Erdogan would emerge victorious. This time it's a little different dynamic.

How is the opposition placed to challenge President Erdogan, Georgi?
I think the most important condition is that elections should be fair and this is hard to expect from Erdogan who has jailed political opponents, he has banned opposition parties. On 10 April, Turkey's chief prosecutor submitted his final case to the Constitutional Court to shut down the opposition party HDP, a major party of the Kurdish minority, the leader of which, Selahattin Demirtaş, is in jail for several years now. Already before that the Court froze the HDP access to its bank account, a bank account through which it should normally receive state funding according to law.

It is, of course, significant that CHP, the Party of Kılıçdaroğlu, won the crucial mayoral elections in the big cities of Ankara Istanbul and Izmir in 2019, but Turkey is a big country with a lot of rural populations and more broadly, it's a country of many contrasts including, secularism and Islamism, modernity and populism. I think the elections will be decided along those fault lines.
Asli, how optimistic do you think we can be that the system can support a democratic process?
Already in the run up to the elections you have a situation where democratic norms are bent and the race takes place in an uneven playing field. Add to that the government’s sort of illiberal authoritarian instincts, add to that the monopoly over mainstream media. Turkey is a country that has had very strong security services, that has had remnants of the deep state. I think, also laws that allow the government to control social media and spread of some information, even though social media is effectively an arena of free speech, despite everything, you also have the oversight of government.

That makes it difficult for the opposition. But it doesn't make it impossible. On the day of elections it tends to be generally transparent. So all of this, people being detained, definitely suppression, a little bit more on the Kurdish side and in eastern provinces, you know, sort of uneven playing field, all of that is in the run up to the elections. The truth is Turkey is this unique country where on the day of elections it's competitive and transparent. And I think that is why this election is up for surprises. And our indicator for that is in 2019, in local elections, opposition parties got together in a similar way and swept across Turkey, winning nearly all major cities, and Istanbul metropolitan area. So it is possible despite the odds.

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Asli, how might President Erdogan react to being successfully challenged?
So I think that a neck situation would be very difficult and certainly the government would ask for a recount. But if the gap is big enough, if the margin of an opposition victory is over one or 2%, probably, let's say 2%, I think President Erdogan would concede. And I know people are shocked when I say that, because they expect me to say in interviews, no, President Erdogan will never give up power, et cetera. I don't think that's true.

He has built his entire legitimacy on elections, the ballot, and he talks about it all the time: electoral legitimacy, how he's won. He has the right to do what he does because he's won the majority vote in the country, that people are behind him... And that's been his entire political career. So I don't think he would defy that. Of course, if the margin is small he might try to contest it here and there, but something that has 1%, 2% difference, I think he would agree and I think the system would declare the winner.

What would be difficult for Turkey would be a runoff, if there's no apparent winner in the first round, that means if neither candidate attains 51% in the first round on May 14th. Then there will be a runoff two weeks after that and I think there the government will use all that it can to clinch in a victory. It's going to be a politically tense period, no doubt. And that is something that people on all sides of the political aisle have flagged for me as a risky period.

Another scenario that I think would be very difficult, looking forward, is a cohabitation: president Erdogan managing to clench in a victory but losing the majority to form in the parliament. Or the reverse, Kılıçdaroğlu, the opposition candidate, winning but losing the majority to Erdogan in the first round. I think all of those scenarios would be very problematic, would be a bit similar to the situation in Israel where you have election after election in a divided society. And I think many people, both from the finance world and international observers would conclude that this is only the first of a number of elections, that the jury is still out, and that there will be more to this saga.

And what do you see as key focus areas for whoever leads Turkey post-election?
I think the top challenge after the elections for the next government will be the economy. President Erdogan has run the Turkish economy by decrees and in a fairly eccentric manner. He defies economic theory and has his own ideas, for example, really thinks of interest rates as the mother of all evil and has, instead of raising interest rates, he has lowered interest rates in fighting inflation, which as a result grew the inflation numbers that Turkey has.

The numbers are not looking good. The balance books are not really looking good. The Turkish Central bank is in a fragile position, so people worry about balance of payments crisis or a devaluation of Turkish Lira, and even a bank run. And I think it would be very important for the next government, particularly if the opposition wins, first of all to say they are going to return to a rules-based, predictable management of the economy. In other words, orthodox economy And I think secondly, to put forward figures that the markets, in Turkey and internationally, trust. They have among their ranks, likes of Bilge Yilmaz from İYİ Parti with a finance, background, a Wharton professor, and Ali Babacan and his team that have run Turkish foreign policy during the period when Erdogan government was very successful, he's well known in the international community, sort of a Davos man. And so those figures would be important to have in the next government. I think if President Erdogan wins the economy, again, will be the Achilles heel and could rapidly unravel.

The second big issue would be legislatively how to undo what is effectively a one man regime. The opposition's top pledge is that they're going to return to a rules-based order and reverse the hyper-centralised governance system that President Erdogan has brought about legally and constitutionally. But doing something is very difficult and might take a while. A state is an organism, particularly the Turkish state, that is complex and requires tough measures and at the same time patience. And I think the government's challenge would be how to bring about a rule of law situation without triggering a preservation reflex from the Turkish state.

The other focus for us is Turkey's relationship with Europe, which is complex at the best of times. What critical elements are at stake, and how might these be affected by the electoral outcome?

A relationship with the EU is a non-issue right now in Turkey, before the elections. And I think there are two sides to it. First of all, if the opposition indeed wins, as the poll suggests for the time being, they are looking to relaunch our relationships with many of the historic allies of Turkey, namely the EU, the US and NATO. However, I think while we're questioning how the perspectives in Turkey will change with regards to the EU in particular, I think we also need to talk about whether the EU is ready for a change in Turkey. Because in recent years, let's say, the relationship has been on a transactional basis, right? It's either on security or cooperation over the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or the refugee deal, which is a rather immoral way of handling relationships between two partners. These all have been non-institutional and transactional.

Georgi, Turkey received EU candidate status in Helsinki in 1999, but ceased qualifying for EU accession under Erdogan: can you remind us of how events unfolded?

I was there in Helsinki and I remember Bülent Ecevit arriving with three airplanes and stating that Turkey will be the leader country in democracy and secularism among the countries having a majority of Muslim population. Those were powerful messages but there was no such continuity with Erdogan. The Turkish coup attempt of 15th July 2016 helped Erdogan strengthen his grip and send to jail political opponents. Then in 2016, the European Parliament voted to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey over human rights, the rule of law. In December, the European Council decided that it would open no new chapters in Turkey's membership talks. Then came the migrant crisis of 2015-2016, which created a new paradigm in relations with Erdogan repeatedly warning that he would flood Europe with migrants.

I think it should be added, it's important in the global picture, the direct military intervention of Turkey into Syria: Turkey, Syria hitting at Kurdish forces in northern Syria and this is continuing. Then came the constitutional referendum in 2017 as a result of which the office of the Prime Minister was abolished and the existing parliamentary system was replaced with an executive presidency and the presidential system. I should also mention the tensions with Greece over the delimitation of economic zones in the Mediterranean, and the Turkish ambitions to pump offshore gas. Last but not least, Turkey's veto on Sweden joining NATO has irritated Western capitals and many hope for a change of power in Ankara, which would also help overcome this blockade.

I think what the opposition is looking to have going forward is to yes, relaunch the relationship with the EU but also the expectation from the EU is to actually work together with Turkey to come up with a more legal framework under which relationships may continue. Obviously, the accession process does provide a framework, and Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu did pledge to start some of the chapters of that negotiation immediately, particularly I think pertaining to public procurement, because obviously there are a lot of irregularities there in Turkey. But I think the way things are, the accession process does not really provide a sufficient framework for the bilateral relationships. I mean, for example, the talk on the custom union modernisation and deepening have been on hold, and that's actually the only legal framework left to continue a meaningful dialogue between the EU and Turkey. So I think that's one area that both sides will need to focus on. And obviously this is in the event that the opposition wins; in the event that Mr. Erdogan wins and our party government continues to rule Turkey, I think the same kind of transactional nature of the relationship will remain intact.

So any changes will take time and effort from all sides?
I think that one should not expect major changes in the Turkish foreign policy, even if Erdogan loses power. For example, I don't think Turkish policy vis-a-vis Greece would change. But the Turkish veto against Sweden, at least, should be overcome. Possibly a better climate of relations should be expected between Ankara and Brussels.

An overnight return to the bosom of the transatlantic community would be very difficult. Even though Turkey's next leaders would want it, they need a balancing act with Russia, which controls not just the Black Sea now, but also Turkey's Southern flank by way of its presence in Syria. Turkey has to have a balancing act when it comes to Russia: Russia-US and Russia-Ukraine war. And then the other issue is, obviously, how to continue the de-escalation process in Syria without getting entangled with some of the regional turmoil in Syria and Iraq. These will be important issues. And on those issues, I think, a sort of timed-out rollout of a pivot is going to be more likely than an overnight shift in foreign policy. So I think it's a nail-biting election and certainly a consequential election for the world.
I am Anny Tubbs and this was EURACTIV’s Beyond the Byline podcast. If you want to follow more news on the Turkish presidential elections please head to EURACTIV.com. And if you haven’t subscribed to this podcast, you can do so on your favorite podcasting app. This episode was produced by myself together with our executive producer, Malte Ketelsen. Thank you for listening and we look forward to welcoming you back next week!